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Some chronic pain patients and healthy individuals experience pain when observing injury
or others in pain. To further understand shared pain, we investigated perspective taking,
bodily ownership and tooth pain sensitivity. First, participants who reported shared pain
(responders) and those who did not (non-responders) viewed an avatar on a screen.
Intermittently, 0–3 circles appeared. Sometimes the participant’s and avatar’s perspective
were consistent, both directly viewed the same circles, and sometimes inconsistent, both
directly viewed different circles. Responders were faster than non-responders to identify
the number of circles when adopting a consistent perspective. Second, participants
sat with their left hand hidden while viewing a rubber hand. All participants reported
an illusory sensation of feeling stroking in the rubber hand and a sense of ownership
of the rubber hand during synchronous stroking of the rubber and hidden hand. The
responders also reported feeling the stroking and a sense of ownership of the rubber
hand during asynchronous stroking. For experiment three, participants with either low,
moderate, or high tooth sensitivity observed a series of images depicting someone eating
an ice-popsicle. Low sensitivity participants never reported pain. In contrast, moderate
and high sensitivity participants reported pain in response to an image depicting someone
eating an ice popsicle (4 and 19% of the time, respectively) and depicting someone eating
an ice-popsicle and expressing pain (23 and 40%, respectively). In summary, responders
have reduced ability to distinguish their own and others’ visual perspective and enhanced
ability to integrate a foreign arm into their bodily representation. The tendency to share
pain is also enhanced when an observed pain is commonly experienced by the observer.
Shared pain may therefore involve reactivation of pain memories or pain schema that are
readily integrated into a self perspective and bodily representation.
Keywords: pain, empathy, illusion, vicarious, sensitivity
INTRODUCTION
A significant number of patients with phantom limb pain report
pain in response to the observation of injuries or other thoughts
and images associated with pain (Giummarra and Bradshaw,
2008; Fitzgibbon et al., 2009, 2010; Giummarra and Moseley,
2011) and some patients report feeling touch when observing
others being touched (Goller et al., 2013). Normal control pop-
ulations also report feeling pain when observing images or videos
of others’ injuries (Osborn and Derbyshire, 2010) and some nor-
mal subjects also report feeling touch sensations when observing
another person being touched (Banissy et al., 2009). Thus, there
is evident capacity for shared sensory experience, including phys-
ically painful experience, that extends beyond a shared emotional
empathic response (Singer et al., 2004; Botvinick et al., 2005;
Jackson et al., 2005, 2006) or a metaphorical shared pain expe-
rience (Eisenberger et al., 2003; MacDonald and Leary, 2005).
The mechanisms behind such shared physical experiences remain
uncertain and here we investigate the influence of visual perspec-
tive taking, bodily ownership, and prior pain experience.
Visual perspective taking refers to the ability to predict what
another person sees (Michelon and Zacks, 2006). Increased ability
to process information in the first person perspective relative to
the third person perspective suggests that visual perspective may
play a crucial role in the representations of self and the represen-
tations of other (Jeannerod and Anquetil, 2008). Successful social
interaction requires inferring the visual and mental perspectives
of others. The ability to infer what another person can see implies
disengaging from the self visual perspective and adopting the
visual perspective of another (Samson et al., 2010). Self perspec-
tive is considered as a default egocentric bias that is corrected or
inhibited when trying to understand others (Keysar and Henly,
2002). Studies have shown that some participants can suppress
self perspective more quickly, suggesting that some individuals
more readily adopt the perspective of others (Epley et al., 2004;
Samson et al., 2005). Here it is hypothesized that individuals who
report feeling pain in response to seeing others’ injuries, known
as pain responders, will have fewer processing constraints from a
first to third person perspective and thus will map across visual
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perspectives more quickly and easily relative to non-pain respon-
ders who never report feeling pain in response to seeing others’
injuries.
A way of exploring bodily ownership is to utilize the rub-
ber hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). The rubber
hand illusion is induced when a participant sits with their
hand and arm hidden by a partition while viewing a rubber
hand and arm in an anatomically appropriate position such
that their hand and arm could be in the position of the rub-
ber hand and arm. The experimenter then synchronously strokes
both the hidden hand and the rubber hand. Within a few
minutes, most subjects report that the stroking sensation no
longer feels as if it is coming from their hidden real hand
but is actually emanating from the observed rubber hand. This
illusory sensation and feeling of ownership over the rubber
hand is thought to come about through multisensory integra-
tion of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information (Haggard
and Tsakiris, 2005). After establishing the illusion, “injuring”
the rubber hand by bending back a finger causes an elevated
skin-conductance response (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003),
although skin-conductance is a general measure of arousal and
so may not be linked to a feeling of threat or pain. Threatening
the rubber hand with a knife, however, activates regions of the
brain associated with anticipated pain (Ehrsson et al., 2007).
A noxious stimulus can also result in pain mislocated into the
rubber hand (Capelari et al., 2009; Mohan et al., 2012). Pain
evoked by someone else’s injury seems to involve a misattri-
bution of threat from the location of the observed injury to
the same location on the observer (Osborn and Derbyshire,
2010). Thus, it is hypothesized that pain responders will have
stronger illusory sensation and feeling of ownership over the
rubber hand during the rubber arm illusion compared with
non-responders.
The role of prior pain experience when sharing pain through
observation has been explored in several reports on phan-
tom limb pain (Fitzgibbon et al., 2009, 2010). Phantom limb
patients have reported experiencing heightened phantom pain
when observing, thinking about, or inferring the pain of another.
At least sometimes the pain is linked to the patient’s par-
ticular history. For example, one patient experienced pain in
his lower limb stumps when observing someone walking bare-
foot (Fitzgibbon et al., 2009). Following a particularly distress-
ing and painful emergency caesarean section, another patient
reported shooting pains from the groin that radiated down
the legs when hearing about others’ trauma (Giummarra and
Bradshaw, 2008). These case studies imply that shared pain
experience might reactivate prior or ongoing pain sensations.
Here it is hypothesized that participants with high tooth sen-
sitivity will be more likely to report a shared pain experience
when viewing someone expressing pain while consuming an ice
popsicle than participants without tooth sensitivity. Tooth sensi-
tivity is a common dental problem characterized by short, sharp
pain from the teeth in response to a variety of stimuli often
including cold stimuli (Addy, 1992). Thus, tooth sensitive par-
ticipants were considered a convenient population to test the
possibility that shared pain experience can involve reactivation of
previous pain.
The three studies described here will provide insight into
mechanisms of shared pain experience. Specifically, it is possible,
but yet to be demonstrated, that shared pain involves readily tak-
ing the perspective of another person, which may be indexed by
more rapid orientation to the visual perspective of others (exper-
iment one); readily mapping the location of injury of another to
the self, which may be indexed by stronger sense of mislocating
sensation into a rubber arm (experiment two); and readily inte-
grating the observed pain of another into a personal historical
schema, whichmay be indexed by activation of tooth pain in those
with and without tooth sensitivity (experiment three).
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
EXPERIMENT ONE
Twenty six self selecting participants (3 males; mean age = 19;
range = 18–21) provided informed consent and took part in
experiment one for course credit. All participants were examined
in a single session by a female experimenter. Participants observed
a series of images or videos depicting injury and rated any
pain responses (Osborn and Derbyshire, 2010). If a participant
reported pain they were asked additional questions to explore
the nature of the pain experience and to ensure that feelings
of unpleasantness or visceral reaction were clearly discriminated
from somatic signs of noxious experience. Further questions
included: “How long did the pain sensation last?,” “How would
you describe the pain sensation you felt?,” “How did it feel?,”
“Have you previously experienced a similar kind of pain following
an injury or other problem?,” and “Do you get this type of pain
in everyday life or when you watch a movie?” The investigator
asked additional questions to clarify the nature of the experience
as somatic, rather than just visceral or emotional, when neces-
sary. Those responding to at least one image or video with a
pain response that was not just an emotional or “gut” reaction
were assigned as a responder to yield ten responders and sixteen
non-responders.
All participants then took part in a reaction time experiment
involving an avatar viewed on a computer screen surrounded by
three virtual walls (following the design of Samson et al., 2010). A
female avatar was used for female participants and a male avatar
for male participants. At intermittent intervals, 0–3 circles were
presented either on the wall facing the avatar or on the wall facing
away from the avatar (Figure 1).
The participant could always see the number of circles. In half
of the trials the avatar was observing the same number of circles
as the participant such that the avatar’s and the participant’s per-
spective were consistent. In the other half of the trials the avatar
observed a different number of circles to the participant such that
the avatar’s and the participant’s perspective were inconsistent.
The position of the avatar was randomized for each trial. Prior to
seeing the room, participants were cued to adopt either their own
perspective, which was written as “you,” or the perspective of the
avatar, which was written as “he” or “she” as appropriate. For half
of the trials the participants adopted the perspective of the avatar
and for the other half they adopted their own perspective. After
viewing the screen for 750ms, participants were asked to identify
the number of circles on the wall from their adopted perspec-
tive (self or other) as quickly as possible. There were 96 trials in
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total. Time taken to press the button was automatically recorded.
Reaction times 2.5 standard deviations outside the mean were
removed as outliers.
EXPERIMENT TWO
Fifty two new self selecting participants (all females; mean age
= 20; range 18–22) provided informed consent and took part in
experiment two for course credit. All participants observed the
images or videos depicting injury, as before, and 19 reported pain
to at least one image or video (responders).
All participants then took part in a test of the rubber hand
illusion. A purpose built partition and cover allowed each par-
ticipant to sit with their left arm and hand hidden from view. All
participants wore a yellow rubber glove on their right hand and
were seated with their arms resting on a table in front of them.
The partition obscured their view of their left arm and hand and
the gloved rubber arm and hand was placed on the visible side
of the partition positioned where the participant indicated it felt
natural, “as though my own left arm could comfortably be rest-
ing there.” Two experimental conditions, synchronous stroking
of the participant’s left hand and the rubber hand and asyn-
chronous stroking of the participant’s hand and the rubber hand
then followed and continued for 1min. The order of conditions
(synchronized or asynchronized stroking) was randomized across
participants. Immediately after finishing each condition, the par-
ticipant was asked to fill out the Botvinick and Cohen (1998)
questionnaire. The Botvinick and Cohen (1998) questionnaire
includes eight items describing perceptual qualities associated
with the rubber arm illusion. The first three items have been pre-
viously demonstrated as highly correlated with the rubber hand
illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). Participants were asked to
FIGURE 1 | The figure shows two dots and an avatar observing two
dots (top), consistent with the participant’s viewpoint or observing
one dot (bottom), inconsistent with the participant’s viewpoint.
what extent they agreed or disagreed with each statement from 3
(strong agreement that the sensation or experience was felt) to −3
(strong disagreement).
EXPERIMENT THREE
Sixty-three new participants (7 males; mean age 20; range 18–
21) were recruited by advertisement from the University of
Birmingham and surrounding area. All participants provided
consent. Participants completed a “teeth sensitivity” question-
naire which included the following items: “how much pain do
you feel when you eat cold foods (0 = none, 10 = most pain
imaginable),” “how sensitive do you think your teeth are (0 =
not at all, 10 = extremely),” and “do you receive treatment for
sensitive teeth (Y/N).” Participants who scored 15 or above and
who reported receiving treatment for teeth sensitivity were cate-
gorized as high sensitivity (n = 20). Participants who scored 10
or below and who reported not receiving treatment for sensitive
teeth were categorized as low sensitivity (n = 21). The remaining
participants were categorized as moderate sensitivity (n = 22).
Participants viewed a series of six images of a male or female
face depicting three conditions: expressing pain, eating an ice-
popsicle and not expressing pain and eating an ice-popsicle and
expressing pain (see Figure 2). The final image was expected
to elicit a greater frequency of pain in participants with tooth
sensitivity. The image expressing pain alone was intended to con-
trol for evoked pain independent of tooth sensitivity similar to
previous studies (Osborn and Derbyshire, 2010) and the image
not expressing pain and eating an ice-popsicle controlled for the
influence of observing an act that could cause the observer pain.
The images were presented for three seconds and then the partic-
ipants were asked if they felt any sensation of pain while viewing
the image. It was emphasized that the pain should be felt in the
body and general feelings of unpleasantness or unease should not
be recorded as painful (following Osborn and Derbyshire, 2010).
Participants who reported pain also rated the intensity of their
pain using a visual analogue scale (VAS) (anchored at 0 for no
pain and at 10 for most pain imaginable) and the short-form
McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ). All participants completed
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) to assess trait empa-
thy and rated their empathic feelings (state empathy) toward
the person in each image using a numerical rating scale from
FIGURE 2 | The figure shows the images used for experiment three. On
the left is pain alone, in the middle is the ice popsicle alone and on the
right is pain with the ice popsicle.
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zero (indicating no compassion, warmth, or sympathy toward the




Figure 3 shows the reaction times for the consistent and incon-
sistent trials, when adopting a self or other perspective, for the
responder and non-responders separately. Participants were faster
across groups and conditions for the consistent trials. The dif-
ference between consistent and inconsistent trials when adopting
a self perspective, however, was greater for the responders com-
pared to the non-responders. In contrast, the difference when
adopting an other perspective was greater for the non-responders
compared with the responders. Prior to analysis, the data were
examined for violations of normality including skewness and
violations were not exceptional (measures of skewness ranged
from 0.1 to 1.0). The data were also tested for equality of vari-
ance and no violation of unequal variance was evident (p =
0.48). Thus, a 2 (consistent/inconsistent) × 2 (self/other per-
spective) × 2 (responder/non-responder) ANOVA was used to
formally assess the data. The ANOVA confirmed a main effect
of consistency [F(1, 24) = 28.6, p < 0.001] a consistency by per-
spective interaction [F(1, 24) = 12.6, p < 0.01] and a trend toward
a three way interaction of consistency, perspective and group
[F(1, 24) = 3.7, p = 0.07]. No other effects reached or trended
toward significance.
Post-hoc paired t-tests were used to explore the interaction of
consistency with perspective and revealed significant differences
between consistent and inconsistent trials when adopting the self
(t = 2.9, p < 0.05) and other (t = 6.4, p < 0.001) perspective in
responders but only when adopting the other perspective in non-
responders (t = 5.4, p < 0.001). No other differences reached
significance.
EXPERIMENT TWO
Prior to analysis, the Botvinick and Cohen questionnaire data
were examined for violations of normality including skewness
and violations were not exceptional (measures of skewness ranged
FIGURE 3 | The figure shows the reaction times in responders and
non-responders during consistent and inconsistent trials when
adopting self and other perspective. Post-hoc significant differences are
indicated.
from−0.75 to 0.04). The data were also tested for equality of vari-
ance and a violation of unequal variance was evident (p < 0.001)
and so corrected degrees of freedom were implemented. The
data were first examined with a 2 (synchronous/asynchronous
stroking) × 8 (question) × 2 (responder/non-responder)
ANOVA for formal assessment. The results revealed significant
heterogeneity across questions [F(4.7, 230) = 22.7, p < 0.001] as
well as a significant main effect of synchronicity [F(1, 49) = 5.4,
p < 0.05]. Question one (“It seemed as if I were feeling the touch
of the paintbrush in the location where I saw the rubber hand
touched”) received the highest score and question eight (“It felt
as if my real hand were turning rubbery”) the lowest score. Scores
were higher during synchronized compared with asynchronized
stroking. The interactions of question with group and ques-
tion with condition were significant [F(4.7, 230) = 2.3, p < 0.05;
F(4.9, 242) = 2.4, p < 0.05] but there was no significant three-way
interaction of question, condition and group [F(4.9, 242) = 1.8,
p = 0.11]. No other effects reached, or approached, significance.
The data were explored further by analyzing the three criti-
cal questions relating to feeling the stroking of the brush, feeling
the stroking being caused by the touch of the brush on the
rubber hand, and feeling ownership of the rubber hand, using
a 2 (synchronous/asynchronous stroking) × 3 (question) × 2
(responder/non-responder) ANOVA. The results are illustrated in
Figure 4.
From Figure 4 it can be seen that the responders tend to
have greater responses than non-responders, largely because
the responder scores remained high even during asynchronous
stroking. Formal analysis confirmed the main effect of group
[F(1, 50) = 5.8, p < 0.05], synchronicity [F(1, 50) = 4.3, p < 0.05]
and question [F(2, 100) = 3.6, p < 0.05] as well as a significant
interaction of synchronicity with group [F(1, 50) = 3.6, p < 0.05]
and synchronicity with question [F(2, 100) = 9.7, p < 0.001] but
no three way interaction of synchronicity, question, and group
FIGURE 4 | The figure shows the group mean ratings for feeling the
touch of the brush on the rubber hand (“Feeling”), reporting the touch
to be caused by the brush (“Cause”) and feeling as if the rubber hand
was the participant’s hand (“Ownership”).
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[F(2, 100) = 2.1, p = 0.11]. No other effects reached, or came
close, to significance.
EXPERIMENT THREE
High sensitivity participants reported more pain in the presence
of the ice-popsicle than the other two groups. The low sensitivity
participants never reported pain (see Table 1). A series ofχ2 anal-
yses revealed a significant effect of group for pain responses to the
pain without ice popsicle picture [χ2(2) = 7.4, p < 0.05], the no
pain with ice popsicle picture [χ2
(2) = 19.1, p < 0.001] and the
pain with ice popsicle picture [χ2
(2) = 30.2, p < 0.001].
The mean VAS pain ratings for each group in response to
each class of image are shown in Figure 5. The data were ana-
lyzed using a 3 (group—high, moderate or low sensitivity) × 3
(image—pain without ice popsicle, no pain with ice popsicle or
pain without ice popsicle) × 2 (gender—male or female picture)
ANOVA. The main effects of group and image were significant
[F(2, 60) = 3.7, p < 0.05; F(2, 120) = 9.1, p < 0.001] and so was
the interaction of image with group [F(4, 120) = 2.6, p < 0.05].
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed significantly (p < 0.05)
greater pain in the moderate sensitivity group compared with
the high and low sensitivity groups for the pain without ice
popsicle picture. Both the high and moderate sensitivity groups
reported significantly greater pain compared with the low sen-
sitivity group for the pain with ice popsicle picture. No other
differences reached significance.
Out of the 79 pain reports, 74 were reported in the teeth, face,
or head (two were reported in the lower back, two in the right
foot and one in the chest). The pain was typically described as
sharp (used 57 times), shooting (39), aching (36), and throbbing
(30). Trait empathy was similar across groups (high = 78, mod-
erate = 79, low = 83) but state empathy differed according to
group as shown in Figure 6. State empathy data were formally
analyzed using a 3 (group—high, moderate or low sensitivity) ×
3 (image—pain without ice popsicle, no pain with ice popsicle or
pain without ice popsicle) × 2 (gender—male or female picture)
ANOVA. The main effects of group and image were significant
[F(2, 60) = 7.2, p < 0.01; F(2, 120) = 67.7, p < 0.000] and so was
the interaction of image with group [F(4, 120) = 3.8, p < 0.01].
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed significantly (p < 0.05)
higher ratings in the moderate sensitivity compared with low sen-
sitivity group for the pain without ice popsicle picture; higher
ratings in the high sensitivity group compared with moderate
and low sensitivity groups and higher ratings in the moderate
sensitivity compared with the low sensitivity group for the pain
with ice popsicle picture; and higher ratings in the high andmod-
erate sensitivity groups compared with the low sensitivity group
for the no pain with ice popsicle picture. No other differences
reached significance.
DISCUSSION
Three experiments, involving different samples of participants
who do (responders) and do not (non-responders) report directly
FIGURE 5 | The figure shows the mean VAS pain ratings for each tooth
sensitivity group in response to each image type. Post-hoc significant
differences are indicated.
FIGURE 6 | The figure shows the mean state empathy ratings for each
tooth sensitivity group in response to each image. Post-hoc significant
differences are indicated.
Table 1 | Shows the number of times participants in the high, moderate (Mod) and low sensitivity groups responded with or without pain for
the three image conditions.
Pain without ice-popsicle No pain with ice-popsicle Pain with ice-popsicle
High Mod Low High Mod Low High Mod Low
Pain 4 9 0 15 4 0 32 20 0
No pain 76 79 64 65 84 64 48 68 64
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 470 | 5
Derbyshire et al. Feeling the pain of others
sharing others’ pain, were conducted to further understand the
mechanisms of shared pain experience. Experiment one provides
evidence that all participants suffer interference from some-
one else’s visual perspective even when explicitly instructed to
adopt their own perspective, which replicates previous find-
ings (Samson et al., 2010). Experiment one, however, also pro-
vided evidence for greater interference effects when adopting the
perspective of the other compared with the self and this was
driven in part by reduced interference when adopting a self per-
spective. This reduced interference was especially noticeable for
the non-responders although the critical three-way interaction
only trended toward significance. Experiment two provides evi-
dence for a stronger integration of the rubber arm into bodily
representation for responders compared with non-responders.
Experiment three provides evidence that being a pain respon-
der is increased if the observed pain is congruent with a current
pain sensitivity. Specifically, people with high andmoderate tooth
sensitivity were significantly more likely to report pain when
observing an image of someone biting into an ice-popsicle, espe-
cially if the person expressed pain while biting. In combination,
these findings suggest that responders can more readily adopt the
perspective of others, more readily integrate foreign body parts
into their own body schema and more readily experience pain
when observing a behavior that has caused them pain in the past.
The visual perspective taking task used here required the par-
ticipants to make inferences about what another can or cannot
see (Newcombe, 1989). Correctly inferring what another can see
requires the viewer to inhibit their egocentric viewpoint and
adopt the other’s visual perspective. This inhibition of egocen-
tric or self viewpoint can also contribute to understanding the
thoughts and feelings of others by reducing the influence of the
predominant, egocentric, self perspective (Vogeley et al., 2001).
Inhibiting the self-perspective and adopting another’smental per-
spective is considered an essential part of empathic understanding
(Davis, 1980). Imagining a “self” perspective while viewing some-
one in pain, for example, may aid confusion between self and
other perspectives (Lamm et al., 2007).
Visual perspective taking does not necessarily require any
inference regarding the mental state of the other (Newcombe,
1989; Aichhorn et al., 2006). Inferring the mental state of another
and then sharing that state, as is the case with empathy, may
involve subjectively adopting the cognitive perspective of the
other to understand what he or she is thinking. There is a dis-
tinction between the ability to shift visual perspective, which is
a low level skill, and the ability to empathize by thinking what
someone else is thinking or feeling what someone else is feeling.
Presumably lower level skills, including automatic visual perspec-
tive taking, contribute to higher level skills, including empathy
(Samson et al., 2010). It is possible that the low level mecha-
nism of visual perspective taking contributes to the emotional
experience of empathy for another in pain, which correlates with
vicarious sensation of both touch and pain (Singer et al., 2004;
Banissy and Ward, 2007), but that at least some components of
empathy remain independent of vicarious sensation.
Pain responders reported similar experiences of the rubber
hand illusion in the asynchronous stroking as the synchronous
stroking condition. Previous research has demonstrated an atten-
uation of the illusion during asynchronous stroking, stronger
than observed here in the responders (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris
et al., 2006; Makin et al., 2008; Moseley et al., 2008; Aspell
et al., 2009). Although aspects of the rubber hand illusion can
be generated with asynchronous stroking, synchronous stroking
is considered as particularly important for generating feelings
of ownership over an external body part (Makin et al., 2008;
Tsakiris, 2010). Here, reports of body ownership during asyn-
chronous stroking suggest that strong correlations between tactile
and visual input are less important for ownership over another
person’s hand for pain responders.
It is possible that visual information dominates tactile infor-
mation in driving feelings of ownership for responders. Previous
research has demonstrated that viewing a body other than one’s
own tends to activate a visual simulation mechanism that rapidly
readies the somatosensory system to experience observed physical
events (Longo et al., 2011; Cardini et al., 2011, 2012, 2013). Pain
responders might be at the extreme end of this tendency, partly
explaining their experience of pain in response to someone else’s
injury but possibly also explaining why responders were equally
affected by congruous as by incongruous stroking. It is possible,
at least for responders that simply viewing the rubber hand in an
anatomically appropriate position resulted in rapid somatotopic
integration sufficient to compensate for the incongruent tactile
stimulation that followed. Some participants did spontaneously
report feeling the illusion as soon as they placed their arms into
the apparatus but this spontaneous report was not systematically
investigated. Future studies might address whether the illusion
is spontaneously generated more easily in responders compared
to non-responders. A more flexible sense of body part owner-
ship may partially explain how responders relocate an observed
injured body part of another to themselves, producing pain in
the self.
Participants who reported sensitivity to pain when eating cold
foods were significantly more likely to report pain sensation after
observing others eat cold foods. This finding supports the idea
that we feel the pain of others more if we have experienced the
pain ourselves and implies a merging of self and other. Shared
pain experience was also associated with increased state empathy
but not trait empathy. While it is generally accepted that rep-
resentations of self and other overlap during the experience of
empathy, it is less clear how self/other merging occurs. We may
feel what it is like for someone else to be in pain (Like them)
or we may feel what it is like for us to be in pain (Like us)
(Decety and Sommerville, 2003). Like them depends less on self
representations of pain and more on “other” oriented empathic
processes. Like us depends more on “self” oriented representa-
tions of pain and may plausibly be less dependent on “other”
oriented empathic processes. Here participants with self expe-
rience of pain from cold food had increased pain experience
when observing someone eat an ice-popsicle. Thus, our find-
ings point more toward Like us mechanisms than toward Like
them. Like them would have been expected to reveal no pain when
observing someone biting an ice-popsicle but not feeling pain and
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equivalent pain when observing a facial expression of pain with
and without the ice-popsicle.
Interestingly, participants who reported sensitivity to pain
responded with increased pain intensity both to the pain with
ice-popsicle picture and to the no pain with ice-popsicle picture.
Previous research has used images depicting injuries that would
hurt the observer if the same thing happened to them but are also
clearly likely to hurt the person depicted (Morrison et al., 2004;
Singer et al., 2004; Jackson et al., 2005; Osborn and Derbyshire,
2010). Here it is demonstrated that images depicting events that
would only hurt the observer (if they have sensitive teeth) can
cause pain in the observer. In this instance, respondents are not
responding to the pain of the other but are responding to the fact
that the action depicted, biting into an ice-popsicle, could cause
them pain. At the same time, participants without tooth sensi-
tivity, but with similar high levels of trait empathy to those with
tooth sensitivity, did not respond with pain to the images depict-
ing someone expressing pain while biting into an ice-popsicle.
These findings provide a double dissociation away from an expla-
nation of vicarious pain based on empathy with some participants
responding despite the image not depicting pain, and thus reduc-
ing or eliminating a pain induced empathic response, and some
participants not responding despite a pain induced empathic
response to the pain images.
It is also interesting that there was more pain reported by
the moderate sensitivity group to the pain without ice-popsicle
image. This finding further suggests that the pain of the high
sensitivity group is driven largely by the depiction of something
that could hurt them rather than being a general response to an
expression of pain. It remains uncertain, however, why the mod-
erate pain group reported more pain than both the low and high
sensitivity groups.
Including an additional control picture only depicting an ice-
popsicle would have established if merely observing a salient
affective stimulus causes pain in participants with sensitive teeth.
Including this control image was rejected because an ice-popsicle
alone was thought to be unlikely to generate pain. By itself, an
ice-popsicle cannot induce pain, and so the participants would
have no history of pain from ice-popsicles per se, only from biting
into them. In addition, the possibility of causing a diminished
response from showing many ice-popsicle pictures was also con-
sidered. Nevertheless, this lack of control limits the interpretation.
A number of additional limitations also mean that the results
reported here should be treated with caution before replication.
In particular, the critical interaction effect for experiment one
only trended toward significance and many of our response mea-
sures relied on subjective assessment. Similarly for experiment
two, there was insufficient statistical support for a significant
three-way interaction that might indicate more specific influ-
ences of responder vs. non-responder during the rubber hand
illusion. All studies were performed using convenience samples
with numbers comparable to previous research. It is possible that
the studies were simply underpowered to reveal smaller effects.
All experiments involved a relatively limited demographic (mostly
young females) that may introduce bias and difficulties in gener-
alizing the findings. Experiment three, in particular, may involve
demand characteristics driving pain report in those with sensitive
teeth when viewing the ice-popsicle images. Future studies may
benefit from including objective measures, such as GSR, along-
side subjective report, to address at least some of these potential
biases. We are currently investigating brain activation using fMRI
with responders and non-responders to the ice popsicle.
CONCLUSIONS
The studies reported here demonstrate that responders more
readily adopt the perspective of an other and more readily inte-
grate a foreign body part into the self. The number of responders
also increases when the observed pain is one that the participant
is familiar with from their own history. Thus, experiencing pain
when observing the pain of someone else may rely upon the inte-
gration of the other into a self orientated representation of injury
or pain.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks to the Hilary Green Research Fund for generous support
of Jody Osborn, the Research Inspired Curriculum Fund at the
University of Derby for financial support for study three and to
Alex Cameron for data collection for study three.
REFERENCES
Addy, M. (1992). Clinical aspects of
dentine hypersensitivity. Proc. Finn.
Dent. Soc. 88, 23–30.
Aichhorn, M., Perner, J., Kronbichler,
M., Staffen, W., and Ladurner, G.
(2006). Do visual. perspective tasks
need theory of mind? Neuroimage
30, 1059–1068. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2005.10.026
Armel, K. C., and Ramachandran, V.
S. (2003). Projecting sensations
to external objects: evidence from
skin conductance response. Proc.
Biol. Sci. 270, 1499–1506. doi:
10.1098/rspb.2003.2364
Aspell, J. E., Langgenhager, B., and
Blanke, O. (2009). Keeping
in touch with one’s self:
multisensory mechanisms of self-
consciousness. PLoS ONE 4:6488.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0006488
Banissy, M. J., Cohen Kadosh, R.,
Maus, G. W., Walsh, V., and
Ward, J. (2009). Prevalence,
characteristics and a neurocog-
nitive model of mirror-touch
synaesthesia. Exp. Brain Res.
198, 261–272. doi: 10.1007/
s00221-009-1810-9
Banissy, M. J., and Ward, J. (2007).
Mirror-touch synaesthesia is linked
with empathy. Nat. Neurosci. 10,
815–816. doi: 10.1038/nn1926
Botvinick, M., and Cohen, J. D. (1998).
Rubber hand ‘feels’ what eyes
can see. Nature 391, 756. doi:
10.1038/35784
Botvinick, M., Jha, A. P., Bylsma, L.
M., Fabian, S. A., Solomon, P.
E., and Prkachin, K. M. (2005).
Viewing facial expressions of pain
engages cortical areas involved
in the direct experience of pain.
Neuroimage 25, 312–319. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.11.043
Capelari, E. D., Uribe, C., and Brasil-
Neto, J. P. (2009). Feeling pain
in the rubber hand: integration of
visual, proprioceptive, and painful
stimuli. Perception 38, 92–99. doi:
10.1068/p5892
Cardini, F., Haggard, P., and Ladavas,
E. (2013). Seeing and feeling
for self and other: propriocep-
tive spatial location determines
multisensory enhancement of
touch. Cognition 127, 84–92. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2012.12.010
Cardini, F., Longo, M. R., Driver,
J., and Haggard, P. (2012).
Rapid enhancement of touch
from non-informative vision
of the hand. Neuropsychologia
50, 1954–1960. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2012.04.020
Cardini, F., Longo, M. R., and
Haggard, P. (2011). Vision of
the body modulates somatosen-
sory intracortical inhibition.
Cereb. Cortex 21, 2014–2022. doi:
10.1093/cercor/bhq267
Davis, M. H. A. (1980).
Multidimensional approach to
individual differences in empathy.
JSAS Cat. Sel. Doc. Psychol. 10, 85.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 470 | 7
Derbyshire et al. Feeling the pain of others
Decety, J., and Sommerville, J. A.
(2003). Shared representations
between self and other: a social
cognitive neuroscience view.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 527–533. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2003.10.004
Ehrsson, H. H., Holmes, N. P., and
Passingham, R. E. (2005). Touching
a rubber hand: feeling of body
ownership is associated with activ-
ity in multisensory brain areas.
J. Neurosci. 25, 10564–10573. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0800-05.2005
Ehrsson, H. E., Wiech, K., Weiskopf,
N., Dolan, R. J., and Passingham,
R. E. (2007). Threatening a rubber
hand that you feel is yours elicits a
cortical anxiety response. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104, 9828–9833.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.0610011104
Eisenberger, N. I., Lieberman,
M. D., and Williams, K. D.
(2003). Does rejection hurt?
An fMRI study of social exclu-
sion. Science 302, 290–292. doi:
10.1126/science.1089134
Epley, N., Morewedge, C. K., and
Keysar, B. (2004). Perspective
taking in children and adults:
equivalent egocentrism but
differential correction. J. Exp.
Soc. Psychol. 40, 760–768. doi:
10.1016/j.jesp.2004.02.002
Fitzgibbon, B. M., Enticott, P. G.,
Rich, A. N., Giummarra, M. J.,
Gerogiou-Karistianis, N., Tsao,
J. W., et al. (2010). High inci-
dence of ‘synaesthesia for pain’
in amputees. Neuropsychologia
48, 3675–3678. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2010.07.029
Fitzgibbon, B. M., Giummarra,
M. J., Gerogiou-Karistianis, N.,
Enticott, P. G., and Bradshaw,
J. L. (2009). Shared pain: from
empathy to synaesthesia. Neurosci.
Biobehav. Rev. 34, 500–512. doi:
10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.10.007
Giummarra, M. J., and Bradshaw, J.
L. (2008). “Synaesthesia for pain:
feeling pain with another,” in
Mirror Neuron Systems: The Role
of Mirroring Processes in Social
Cognition, ed J. A. Pineda (Totowa,
NJ: Humana Press Inc.), 287–307.
Giummarra, M. J., and Moseley, G.
L. (2011). Phantom limb pain and
bodily awareness: current concepts
and future directions. Curr. Opin.
Anaesthesiol. 24, 524–531. doi:
10.1097/ACO.0b013e32834a105f
Goller, A. I., Richards, K., Novak, S.,
and Ward, J. (2013). Mirror-touch
synaesthesia in teh phantom limbs
of amputees. Cortex 49, 243–251.
doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2011.05.002
Haggard, P., and Tsakiris, M. (2005).
The rubber hand illusion revis-
ited: visuotactile integrations and
self-attribution. J. Exp. Psychol.
Human 31, 80–91. doi: 10.
1037/0096-1523.31.1.80
Jackson, P. L., Brunet, E., Meltzoff, A.
N., and Decety, J. (2006). Empathy
examined through the neural
mechanisms involved in imagining
how i feel versus how you feel
pain. Neuropsychologia 44, 752–761.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.
2005.07.015
Jackson, P. L., Meltzoff, A. N., and
Decety, J. (2005). How do we
perceive the pain of others? A
window into the neural pro-
cesses involved in empathy.
Neuroimage 24, 771–769. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.09.006
Jeannerod, M., and Anquetil, T. (2008).
Putting oneself in the perspec-
tive of the other: a framework
for self-other differentiation.
Soc. Neurosci. 3, 356–367. doi:
10.1080/17470910701563715
Keysar, B., and Henly, A. S.
(2002). Speakers’ overesti-
mation of their effectiveness.
Psychol. Sci. 13, 207–212. doi:
10.1111/1467-9280.00439
Lamm, C., Batson, C. D., and Decety, J.
(2007). The neural basis of human
empathy – effects of perspective-
taking and cognitive appraisal:
an event-related fMRI study.
J. Cognitive Neurosci. 19, 42–58. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2007.19.1.42
Longo, M. R., Pernigo, S., and Haggard,
P. (2011). Vision of the body
modulates processing in pri-
mary somatosensory cortex.
Neurosci. Lett. 489, 159–163. doi:
10.1016/j.neulet.2010.12.007
MacDonald, G., and Leary, M.
R. (2005). Why does social
exclusion hurt? Psychol.
Bull. 131, 202–223. doi: 10.
1037/0033-2909.131.2.202
Makin, T. R., Holmes, N. P., and
Ehrsson, H. H. (2008). On
the other hand: dummy hands
and peripersonal space. Behav.
Brain Res. 191, 1–10. doi:
10.1016/j.bbr.2008.02.041
Michelon, P., and Zacks, J. M. (2006).
Two kinds of visual perspective
taking. Percept. Psychophys. 68,
327–337. doi: 10.3758/BF03193680
Mohan, R., Jensen, K. B., Petkova, V.
I., Dey, A., Barnsley, N., Ingvar,
M., et al. (2012). No pain relief
with the rubber hand illusion. PLoS
ONE 7:e52400. doi: 10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0052400
Morrison, I., Lloyd, D., di Pellegrino,
G., and Roberts, N. (2004).
Vicarious responses to pain
in anterior cingulate cortex: is
empathy a multisensory issue?
Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 4,
270–278. doi: 10.3758/CABN.4.
2.270
Moseley, G. L., Olthof, N., Venema,
A., Don, S., Wijers, M., Gallace,
A., et al. (2008). Psychologically
induced cooling of a specific
body part caused by the illu-
sory ownership of an artificial
counterpart. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 105, 13169–13173. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0803768105
Newcombe, N. (1989). “Development
of spatial perspective taking,” in
Advances in Child Development
and Behavior, ed H. W. Reese
(San Diego, CA: Academic Press),
203–247.
Osborn, J., and Derbyshire, S. W. G.
(2010). Pain sensation evoked
by observing injury in oth-
ers. Pain 148, 268–274. doi:
10.1016/j.pain.2009.11.007
Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Braithwaite,
J. J., and Andrews, B. J. (2010).
Seeing it their way: evidence for
rapid involuntary computation of
what other people see. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 36,
1255–1266. doi: 10.1037/a0018729
Samson, D., Apperly, I. A.,
Kathirgamanathan, U., and
Humphreys, G. W. (2005). Seeing
it my way: a case of selective deficit
in inhibiting self-perspective.
Brain 128, 1102–1111. doi:
10.1093/brain/awh464
Singer, T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty,
J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R. J., and
Frith, C. (2004). Empathy for pain
involves the affective but not sen-
sory components of pain. Science
303, 1157–1162. doi: 10.1126/sci-
ence.1093535
Tsakiris, M. (2010). My body in the
brain: a neurocognitive model of
body-ownership. Neuropsychologia
48, 703–712. doi: 10.1016/
j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.034
Tsakiris, M., and Haggard, P. (2005).
The rubber hand illusion revisited:
visuotactile integration and self-
attribution. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 31, 80–91. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.31.1.80
Tsakiris, M., Hesse, M. D., Boy, C.,
Haggard, P., and Fink, G. R. (2006).
Neural signatures of body owner-
ship: a sensory network for bodily
self-conscisousness. Cereb. Cortex
17, 2235–2244. doi: 10.1093/cer-
cor/bhl131
Vogeley, K., Bussfeld, P., Newen, A.,
Herrmann, S., Happe, F., and
Falkai, P. (2001). Mind reading:
neural mechanisms of theory
of mind and self-perspective.
Neuroimage 14, 170–181. doi:
10.1006/nimg.2001.0789
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 13 February 2013; accepted: 28
July 2013; published online: 14 August
2013.
Citation: Derbyshire SWG, Osborn J and
Brown S (2013) Feeling the pain of oth-
ers is associated with self-other confu-
sion and prior pain experience. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 7:470. doi: 10.3389/
fnhum.2013.00470
Copyright © 2013 Derbyshire, Osborn
and Brown. This is an open-access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License
(CC BY). The use, distribution or repro-
duction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licen-
sor are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in
accordance with accepted academic prac-
tice. No use, distribution or reproduction
is permitted which does not comply with
these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 470 | 8
